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Foreword 
This paper presents a prescriptive model for a decision maker's risk attitude 
toward financial outcomes that have important non-monetary effects, for  example, 
effects on how the decision maker is judged by himself and by others. The model 
represents the risk attitude of a decision maker who is risk averse in the absence 
of such psychological effects, but who is risk prone in their presence for actions 
leading to net losses o r  the status quo. The model is examined for  its adherence to 
normative principles. In particular, it  is argued that the principle of dominance 
should be specified without any assumptions on preferences between conjunctions 
of lotteries; such assumptions a r e  shown to imply the apparently stronger princi- 
ple of risk neutrality. 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences Program 
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Charles M. Harvey 
Introduction 
Behavioral studies of people's r isk attitudes have found tha t  in a variety of 
contexts t h e  majority of people are r isk averse  in t he i r  preferences among ac- 
tions leading to gains or t he  s tatus  quo but are r isk prone in t he i r  preferences 
among actions leading to losses or t h e  s tatus  quo. Such preferences will be re- 
f e r r e d  to in this pape r  as an averse-prone r i s k  a t t i tude .  
During t h e  ear ly development of expected utility theory, Friedman and Savage 
(1948) and Markowitz (1952) discussed averse-prone risk att i tudes (and even 
three- and four-piece r isk attitudes). Relevant empirical work includes five stu- 
dies, Barnes and Reinmuth (1976), Grayson (1960). Green (1963). Halter and Dean 
(1971), and Swalm (1966), tha t  were examined by Fishburn and Kochenberger 
(1979), and were reexamined together  with o the r  empirical studies by Hershey, 
Kunreuther, and Schoemaker (1982). Other empirical work and analyses are in 
Dickson (1981), Fuchs (1976), Hershey and Schoemaker (198Oa), Langhhunn, 
Payne, and Crum (1980), Schoemaker and Kunreuther (1979), Wehrung , Bassler, 
MacCrimmon, and Stanburg (1978), Wehrung , MacCrimmon, and Brothers (1984), and 
Williams (1966). 
This paper  is a modeling and a subsequent analysis of averse-prone r i sk  atti- 
tudes. In t he  cu r r en t  milieu of research  on preference models, i t  is  important to 
emphasize tha t  t h e  models presented h e r e  are prescriptive r a t h e r  than normative 
or descriptive. They are intended to help a decision maker whose actual prefer-  
ences, i.e., t h e  preferences lying behind his cognitive limitations, are such tha t  h e  
has  an  averse-prone r isk attitude. These models may o r  may not conform to vari- 
ous assumptions of rationality (a matter  tha t  is examined in t he  second p a r t  of this 
paper).  Moreover, they may or may not provide an  accura te  or predictive model- 
ing of t h e  behavior of most people (a matter tha t  i s  commented on but it is not test- 
ed  in this paper).  Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky (1984) and Schoemaker (1982) contain 
recent ,  general discussions of t he  distinctions between the  normative, descriptive, 
and prescr ipt ive modeling of preferences.  
Section 1 discusses the types of psychological responses to financial gains 
and losses that  may induce an averse-prone risk attitude, and presents a r a t h e r  
general model of such risk attitudes. Section 2 then discusses a specialization of 
this model in which the psychological effects of gains and losses are priced-out as 
a "reward" that  is  independent of the  magnitude of the  gain and a "penalty" that  is 
independent of the  magnitude of the loss. In this model, anyone who is  risk averse 
when the psychological effects are absent will have an averse-prone risk attitude 
over  some  m g e  of monetary changes when the psychological effects are present. 
Sections 3 and 4 examine which normative principles are or are not violated 
by an averse-prone risk attitude. The salient conclusion is not a list of yes/no 
answers but that  certain conditions implicit in the  common normative principles 
need to be  made explicit and then examined in isolation. In particular, i t  is shown 
that  certain conditions on preferences between conjunctions of lotteries that  are 
often implicit in the  dominance principle imply the apparently stronger principle 
of risk neutrality. I t  is argued that  these conditions on conjunctions (and a condi- 
tion implicit in the  framing principle) should not be included as normative princi- 
ples. 
Section 5 then re turns  to a prescriptive viewpoint and'discusses the potential 
uses and abuses of an averse-prone risk model f o r  a decision analysis application 
in which risk aversion f o r  gains but risk proneness f o r  losses is an important 
preference issue. 
1. Psychological-Effeds Y odela 
Several researchers  have suggested that a decision maker's risk attitude may 
depend on various psychological effects of financial outcomes that might be includ- 
ed as p a r t  of the description of the decision maker's possible consequences. For 
example, Pe te r  Fishburn, Ralph Keeney, and Richard Meyer (in the  discussion fol- 
lowing a paper presented by Tversky, 1977) suggest the  use of an additional attri- 
bute to explain r isk prone preferences fo r  potential losses in financial choices. A 
similar idea is suggested in Keeney (1984) by his argument that  the  ethics of a 
deontological moralist need not violate the  expected utility conditions provided 
that  the  social consequences of policy decisions are adequately defined (p. 122). 
Moreover, Raiffa (1984) discusses psychological effects by imagining that  the  deci- 
sion maker has an external or internal kibitzer whose remarks could be used to 
provide a m o r e  sophisticated description of the  consequences to t he  decision 
maker. 
In this section, a preference model is developed tha t  is consonant with the  
above ideas. Suppose tha t  financial outcomes t o  the  decision maker are measured 
by a variable z such that  z > 0 represents  net  gains, z < 0 represents  net  losses, 
and z = 0 represents  the  status quo. An individual who is  making a decision tha t  
appears  to depend only on the  financial amounts z may be influenced by the  antici- 
pation of his psychological responses to the  possible consequences of a chosen ac- 
tion. To describe these effects, it will be  helpful t o  distinguish between a decision 
maker who is acting on his own behalf and a decision maker who acting as a n  agent 
f o r  an  organization. 
A person who is acting on his own behalf, e.g., a private entrepreneur o r  an  
individual investor, may feel embarrassment or a loss of self-esteem if a financial 
loss should occur. This person may also feel pride or increased self-esteem as a 
result  of a financial gain. Such a type of psychological response is  h e r e  dis- 
tinguished from a change in financial position. tha t  is, from the  event tha t  the per- 
son will have a certain lesser or grea ter  bmount to spend over  his lifetime. 
For a person who is  acting as an agent f o r  an organization. e.g., a business ex- 
ecutive or a government administrator. t he re  are external pressures in addition to 
the type of ego involvement described above. The person wishes to be favorably 
judged by those to whom he  is  accountable; fo r  example, t he  person's primary con- 
ce rn  may be  to maintain or to enhance his reputation. 
A s  a primary assumption in this paper,  suppose tha t  the  psychological effects 
to be considered can be measured as components of the  consequences to t he  deci- 
sion maker. For modeling purposes, these types of psychological effects will be 
called m c t s  attributes. Each effects attribute will be measured by a variable 
zf . i = 1 ,  ..., n . Consequences will be described by both the  variable z fo r  the  
monetary at t r ibute and the  variables zl, ..., z, f o r  the  effects attributes; thus. 
each consequence will be denoted by a vector (z  ,z I,... ,z, ). 
By contrast, Bell (1982). (1983). (1985) has modeled psychological responses 
such as "regret" and "disappointment" that  depend upon the  decision maker's per- 
ception of all  of the  available lotteries or of the ent ire  lottery that  is  chosen. A s  
stated in Bell (1982) "regret is  measured . . . as the difference in value between 
the  assets actually received and the  highest level of assets produced by other al- 
ternatives [italics Bell's]. " 
In a specific decision context, t h e  amounts z l ,  ..., z, may be highly correlated 
to t he  financial amount z and may even be  functionally dependent on z. However, 
i t  will be  assumed tha t  t he  decision maker is  familiar with a sufficiently wide 
variety of contexts such tha t  his preferences can be  considered on a product set 
of potential consequences ( z  ,z l,... ,z, ) where the  variables z , z  l,... ,z, are defined 
on specific intervals. 
(A) Suppose tha t  t h e  decision maker's tradeoffs satisfy t h e  willingness-to-pay 
conditions (see, e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, pp. 125-127, and Harvey, 1985). 
Then, preferences among consequences in t he  product set can be  represented by a 
value function of t h e  form 
Here, t h e  amounts gi (zi ),i = 1, ..., n ,  can be assessed as pricing-out  a m o u n t s  f o r  
t h e  psychological responses; tha t  is, f o r  some specified response zi * of t h e  i-th 
effects a t t r ibute ,  gi (zi) i s  tha t  amount such tha t  t h e  decision maker would just be  
willing t o  pay gi (zi) in o r d e r  to obtain zi r a t h e r  than zi * . The value V of a conse- 
quence (z ,z l ,  ..., z,) can be  interpreted as the  financial amount such tha t  t he  
consequence ( z  , z l,. .. , z, ) i s  indifferent to t h e  consequence (V,z l* ,... ,z, * ). 
(B) Suppose tha t  t h e  decision maker's r isk att i tude satisfies the  conditions of 
expected utility. Then, preferences among lot ter ies  can be  represented by a utili- 
ty function of t h e  form 
Here, t h e  function u can be  interpreted as a conditional utility function on finan- 
cial amounts z given tha t  t he  psychological effects are t he  specified amounts 
zl* ,..., Zn *. 
Consider next t h e  causal relations between receiving a net  gain or a net loss 
z i s  a specific context and t h e  resulting psychological effects. Suppose tha t  in 
any one decision context t he  psychological effects described by zl. ..., z, are func- 
tionally dependent on the  financial outcome z.  Then, conditional on a given con- 
text: zi = ri ( z ) ,  i = 1 ,  ..., n ,  f o r  some functions r*. The functions ri wi l l  be  re- 
f e r r e d  to as response jbnc t ions .  Note tha t  a decision context does not affect 
tradeoffs between t h e  a t t r ibu tes  but r a t h e r  r e s t r i c t s  t he  domain of potential 
consequences. 
For prescriptive purposes, i t  will be useful to compare the  following two types 
of decision contexts. 
(i) The a c t s  contezt: Here the  decision maker anticipates that  his psycho- 
logical responses are important to him and should be  included in describing the  
consequences of his actions. 
(C) Suppose that  the  response functions zi = ri (z ), i = 1,  ... ,n , as discussed 
above denote the  decision maker's psychological responses in the  effects context. 
Suppose that  larger  monetary amounts z lead to responses zi = ri (z ), i = 1,  ... ,n , 
that are at least as preferred. The responses to maintaining the  status quo, i.e., to 
z = 0 ,  will be denoted by zi * = ri (0)' i = 1 ,..., n .  The amounts zi *, i = 1 ,..., n ,  
will be  called standard a e c t s .  
(ii) The no-effects contezt: Here the psychological responses in the  effects 
context are ei ther  absent or are omitted f r o m  consideration. 
( D )  Suppose that  in the  no-effects context the psychological responses to any 
financial change z are the  standard effects zi * , i = 1, ..., n . Thus, the  effects of 
any change z in the  no-effects context are the  same as the  effects of no change, 
z = 0 ,  in the  effects context. 
Definition 1. A preference model as described in conditions (A)- (D)  will be  called 
a p ~ a j c h o l o g i c a Z ~ e c t s  model. Any utility function u ( z )  defined on monetary 
amounts z in the  no-effects context will be called a ho-q#kcts u t i l i t y  function; 
any utility function w ( z )  defined on monetary amounts z in the  effects context will 
be called an sects u t i l i t y  &nction. 
For a net gain or loss z ,  consider the  associated a c t s  amount e ( z )  defined 
by 
where ri (z ), i = 1, ... ,n , are the psychological effects of z in the  effects context. 
The monetary amount e ( z )  can be interpreted as that  amount such that  the  conse- 
quence (0 ,z  l,... ,zn ) is  indifferent to the  consequence (e  ( z ) ,  z .... ,zn * ), that  is, 
e ( z )  is  the  total pricing-out amount of the  psychological effects 
zi = r i ( z ) ,  i = 1 ,..., n .  
Theorem 1. For a psychological-effects model, if u ( z )  is  any utility function for 
the decision maker's risk attitude in the  no-effects context and w ( z )  is  any utility 
function f o r  the  decision maker's risk attitude in the  effects context, then 
f o r  s o m e  normalization constants a > 0 and 6 .  
The psychological-effects model discussed above is f a r  too restrictive to 
describe the  heuristic biases that might be  responsible for at least par t  of an ob- 
served averse-prone risk attitude. The model is intended as a possible formulation 
of that par t  of an averse-prone risk attitude which the  decision maker regards as 
due to his underlying preferenoes. For such a prescriptive purpose, i t  is  useful to 
fur ther  specialize the  model; the following section presents one means of doing so. 
2. The Rermrd-Penalty Podel 
This section discusses a special type of psychological-effects model fo r  com- 
paring a decision maker's preferences in the effects context and in the no-effects 
context. The model is intended to be sufficiently specific to be tractable for deci- 
sion analysis applications. 
As a strong causal assumption, suppose that  in the effects context the psycho- 
logical responses are constant in the  sense that  
for  some constant amounts zi+ and zi-, i = 1, ..., n. Thus, the effects zi in the ef- 
fects context depend only on whether the financial change is a gain or a loss, and 
not on the magnitude of the  gain or loss. This type of dependence may by appmpri- 
ate as a modeling simplification f o r  a variety of decision situations. For example, 
a decision maker acting as an agent may believe that h e  is being judged in par t  in a 
superficial manner by whether he succeeds (z  > 0), maintains the status quo 
(z  = 0), or fails ( z  < 0). 
I t  follows directly from equations (3) and (5) that 
r i ( z ) = '  
I p f o r z  > O  e ( z ) =  O f o r z = O  -n fo r  z < 0 
zi+ forz > O  
2; f o r z = O  
zi- fo r  z < 0 
b 
f o r  some constant financial amounts p 2 0 and n 2 0. The tradeoffs amounts p and 
n can be  regarded as t he  e x t r a  "reward" and "penalty" in t h e  effects context of a 
gain and a loss respectively. 
Definition 2. A psychological effects model tha t  satisfies t h e  condition of con- 
s tant  psychological effects  summarized in (5), (6) will be  called a reward-penalty 
model. 
Figure 1 i l lustrates a reward-penalty model in which the  utility function w (z) 
f o r  t he  effects context corresponds to a utility function u (z) for t he  no-effects 
context that  represents  r isk aversion. In t h e  effects context, t he  penalty n > 0 
leads to r isk proneness among lot ter ies  whose possible consequences are net  
losses and t h e  s tatus  quo; t h e  reward p > 0 leads to g r e a t e r  risk aversion among 
lot ter ies  whose possible consequences are net gains and the  s tatus  quo. These 
propert ies  a r e  illustrated by the  dotted lines in Figure 1. Thus, w(z)  represents  
a n  averse-prone r isk att i tude ove r  a range of amounts z including both ne t  gains 
and net  losses. 
Figure 1. A Utlllty Functlon for the EfYeats Context 
A numerical illustration of a reward-penalty model can be  calculated by con- 
sidering the  following well-known choice problem presented in Tversky and Kahne- 
man (1981). The percentages noted by the  alternative actions are based on the  
responses of 150 students at Stanford University and the  University of British 
Columbia. 
Problem 1. Imagine tha t  you face the following pa i r  of concurrent decisions. 
First  examine both decisions, then indicate the options you prefer .  
Decision (i). Choose between: 
A. a sure gain of $240 [84 percent] 
B. 25% chance to gain 8l000, and 75% chance to gain nothing 116 percent] 
Decision (ii). Choose between: 
C. a su re  loss of S750 [13 percent] 
D. 75% chance to lose 8l000, and 25% chance to lose nothing [87 percent]. 
A majority [73 percent] of t he  respondents chose actions A and D. The ex- 
pected monetary values of t h e  four  actions are: E(A) = 8240 < E @ )  = 8250, and 
E(C)  = -S750 = E(D). Thus, t h e  students were risk averse  in decision (i) but risk 
prone in decision (ii). 
To model these preferences with a reward-penalty model, suppose tha t  in the  
no-effects context a person has  constant risk aversion (at  least over  the  range of 
gains and losses considered) and assesses a certainty equivalent of $245 f o r  t he  
lottery B. Then, in the  no-effects context, t he  person i s  mildly risk averse; he  
p re fe r s  B to A and p re fe r s  C to D (the opposite of t h e  preferences observed by 
Tversky and Kahneman). 
Now, consider the  person's preferences in the  effects context. For a reward 
amount of p = S7 or more, t he  person will become sufficiently risk averse among 
gains lotteries so tha t  h e  p re fe r s  A to B. For a penalty amount of rr = $21 or 
more, t he  person will become sufficiently risk prone among losses lotteries so that  
h e  prefers  D to C. Therefore, psychological responses to gains and losses tha t  
lead to only modest tradeoffs amounts p and n are sufficient to induce the  choice 
behavior observed by Tversky and Kahneman. 
The assumptions of a reward-penalty model imply in general a number of pro- 
perties fo r  the decision maker's preferences in the effects context. These pro- 
perties are listed in the  result below. Here, a lottery having a net gain or loss of 
z with probability p and a net gain or loss of z' with probability q = 1 -p is 
denoted by < p $2, q Sz ' >. 
Theorem 2. Suppose that a decision maker's preferences satisfy the conditions of 
a reward-penalty model. 
Part L If in the no-effects context the decision maker is risk averse, then in the 
effects context his preferences will have the following properties: 
(a) If the penalty K is positive, then preferences are risk prone f o r  
moderate losses, that is, for  any probability 0 < p < 1,  < p Sz , q 80 > is 
preferred to the  amount Spz f o r  sufficiently small negative z. 
(b) Preferences are risk averse for  moderate or large gains, that is, for any 
probability 0 < p < 1,  the amount Spz is preferred to < p $2, q 80 > fo r  
any positive z . 
(c) If K is greater  than p, then preferences are risk averse f o r  symmetric 
lotteries, that is, 80 is preferred to < $2, + S ( z  ) > fo r  any non-zero 
amount z . 
Part II. If in the no-effects context the decision maker has decreasing risk aver- 
sion and has unbounded utility from below (i.e., f o r  any amounts z < z' there  is an 
amount z "< z such that z i s  preferred to < Sz ", + Sz' > ), then in the effects 
context his preferences have the following additional properties: 
(d) Preferences are risk averse fo r  large losses, that is, fo r  any probability 
0 < p < 1, Spz is preferred to < p $2, q SO > fo r  sufficiently large 
negative z . 
(e) If K > 0, then preferences are more risk averse in the effects context 
then in the no-effects context for str ict  losses, that is, fo r  any t w o  str ict  
losses z , z '  < 0, the certainty equivalent of < p $2, q $2' > is less in the 
effects context than in the no-effects context. 
(f) If p > 0, then preferences are less risk averse in the effects context 
than in the no-effects context fo r  s tr ict  gains, that is, for any t w o  strict 
gains z , z '  > 0, the certainty equivalent of < p $2, q $2' > is more in the 
effects context than in the no-effects context. 
The purpose of Theorem 2 is not to provide a means of testing the  descriptive 
accuracy of a reward-penalty model. The intent i s  r a t h e r  to make explicit to a de- 
cision maker some of the  implications of adopting such a prescriptive model. 
3. Conformity with Normative Principlw 
This section examines whether a risk attitude in a reward-penalty model, or a 
averse-prone risk atti tude in general, confirms to certain conditions on prefer-  
ences tha t  have been regarded from a normative viewpoint as principals fo r  ra- 
tional decision making. The violation of these principles by people's choice 
behavior in non-transparent decision problems has been w e l l  documented, fo r  ex- 
ample, in t h e  work of D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1979), (1981), and (1986). 
3.1. Trans i t i v i t y ,  Dominance, and Independence.. For any reward-penalty model 
in which t h e r e  i s  risk aversion in the  no-effects context and a non-zero penalty n, 
t h e r e  will b e  in the  effects context a n  averse-prone risk atti tude as described in 
pa r t s  (a), (b) of Theorem 2. Such preferences are represented by a utility func- 
tion w ( z  ) as in (4), and hence are consistent with the  normative principles of ex- 
pected utility. I t  follows that,  in particular,  these averse-prone risk attitudes 
satisfy t h e  principles of transitivity, stochastic dominance, and independence. 
3.2. f iaming Consistency. Consider any averse-prone risk attitude with respect  
to a variable z. In this subsection, t h e  r isk attitude may or may not confirm to the  
principles of expected utility. Let I = < pi ,zi > denote a lottery having possible 
consequences zi with probabilities pi where i = 1 ,  ... ,m . 
The variable z is intended to measure changes in monetary position. i.e., ei- 
t he r  changes in the  decision maker's personal finances or changes in the  finances 
of an organization f o r  which the decision maker is acting as a n  agent. The conse- 
quences to the  decision maker can also b e  described as final asset positions meas- 
ured by a variable y .  Assume that: (1) a current  asset position c can be  defined 
(but not necessarily evaluated), (2) t he  amounts z are net monetary gains and 
losses, e.g., net present  values or net after-tax profits, and (3) t he  final asset po- 
sition y implied by c and z is specified by the  formula y = c + z. 
For a situation in which z measures rates of re turn  o r  net pre-tax profits. the 
formula relating y t o  z fo r  a fixed current asset position c  will differ from 
y = c  + z , but there  will still be a one-to-one relationship y = f (z I c  ) between 
financial changes z and final asset positions y.  The results in this subsection 
easily generalize to such situations. 
The preference relation concerning financial changes z conditional on a 
current  asset position c  will be denoted by & ~ c .  An associated preference rela- 
tion & concerning final asset positions y is defined by 
where yi = c  + zt . y j  = c + zj fo r  i = 1 ,..., m and j = 1 ,..., m '. The equivalence 
(7) between preferences when outcomes are described by net gains or losses and 
preferences when outcomes are described by asset positions will be called a fram- 
i n g  tranqfomation. 
Definition 3. A decision maker's preferences such that  the  framing transforma- 
tion (7) is satisfied f o r  every current  asset position c will be called framing con- 
sistent. 
The condition of framing consistency can also be regarded as a consistency . 
condition on preferences concerning financial changes fo r  different current  asset 
positions c  and c ' .  More precisely, framing consistency implies the condition that  
where c , c f  a r e  any two current  asset positions and d = c  - c' .  Conversely, the 
condition (8) implies that  if a preference relation &, on final asset positions is  de- 
fined by (7) with a specific amount c ,  then (7) is also satisfied fo r  any other  mount  
c'. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 273) have demonstrated that  the  manifest 
behavior of students who are presented with hypothetical choice problems is not in 
accord with the condition of framing consistency; often there  a r e  reversals in 
preference depending on whether the problem is framed in terms of a current  as- 
se t  position c  o r  in terms of another current  asset position c ' .  
Theorem 3. The condition that  the  preference relations & ~ c  are averse-prone 
risk attitudes fo r  more than one current  asset position c  is  inconsistent with the 
principle of framing consistency. 
The result  identifies a conflict between a preference condition having a 
strong normative appeal and the choice behavior reported in many articles,  e.g., 
Fuchs (1976), Green (1963). Grether and Plott (1979). Halter and Dean (1971), 
Hershey and Schoemaker (1980a), Hershey and Schoemaker (1980b), Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), Langhhunn, Payne, and Crum (1980), Payne, Langhhunn, and 
Crum (1980), Payne, Langhhunn, and Crum (1981), Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, 
Corrigan, and Combs (1977), Swalm (1966), and Williams (1966). Theorem 3 and the  
remarks in subsection 3.1 imply that  the conflict often alluded to in the  l i terature 
between averse-prone choice behavior and the rules  of rationality is not a conflict 
with the  expected utility conditions, e.g., independence, but is  a conflict with a 
consistency requirement. I t  is  possible, f o r  example, fo r  a person's preferences 
Lk to be an  averse-prone risk attitude and to satisfy expected utility conditions 
f o r  each current  asset position c and yet not to be framing consistent. 
This identification of a specific normative principle tha t  is in conflict with 
averse-prone choice behavior suggests a question f o r  future empirical work. For 
which persons and in which contexts is a person's averse-prone choice behavior a 
result  of a preference issue that  is  of genuine importance to the person r a t h e r  
than a result  of his information processing limitations and of his limited experi- 
ence in risk taking. Dickson (1981) found that  a risk manager, i.e., a person "con- 
fronted continually with problems holding out the  chance of loss" is  likely to be 
considerably m o r e  risk averse f o r  potential loss-producing choices than is  a non- 
risk manager, i.e., a person who "will rarely be concerned with decisions where 
only a loss or break even point i s  in prospect". A survey by Freifelder and Smith 
(1984) has similar results. Hershey and Schoemaker (1980a) and Schoemaker and 
Kunreuther (1979) found that  risk aversion is f a r  grea ter  when decisions are 
presented in an insurance context than when the  s a m e  decisions are presented as 
standard gambles. Experimental studies in Hershey and Schoemaker (1980b) that  
examine the reflection hypothesis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) at both the 
across-sub ject and within-subject levels "seriously question the  generality of 
prospect theory's reflection hypothesis." 
One approach to the  question posed above would be to investigate the  extent 
to which the  same person in different contexts and different persons in the  same 
context would modify the i r  averse-prone choice behavior a f t e r  being informed as 
to i ts conflict with the  normative principle of framing consistency. Slovic and 
Tversky (1974) examine similar questions concerning a person's modification of his 
preferences when informed as t o  i ts  conflict with Savage's independence principle 
for expected utility. 
4. Combinat ions  o f  L o t t e r i e s  
Tversky and Kahnemm (1981), (1986) discuss a type of dominance principle 
tha t  i s  concerned with the  sum of two lotteries. In this section, a general defini- 
tion of this principle is specified, and the  principle i s  shown to be  violated by any 
averse-prone r isk attitude. Dominance concerning sums and multiples of lotteries 
appears  t o  be  appropriate  as a normative principle; however, i t  is shown to have 
implications tha t  render  i t  i t  f a r  too restrictive. Indeed, in an expected utility 
model, this type of dominance i s  shown to imply tha t  t he  decision maker is risk neu- 
tral. 
Consider the  specific choice problem due t o  Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
tha t  i s  described in Section 2. While most of the  students in the sample (73 per- 
cent) prefer red  A t o  B and also prefer red  D to C, none of these students pre- 
f e r r ed  the  sum of A and D to the  sum of B and C: 
Problem 2. Choose between: 
A and D. 25% c h m c e  t o  win 8240, and 
75% chance to lose 8760. [0 percent] 
B and C. 25% chance t o  win 8250, and 
75% chance to lose 8750. [ lOO percent] 
Tversky and Kahneman argue tha t  t he  students' decisions are "violations of 
t he  rules of rational choice" and, more specifically, "violations of dominance" fo r  
those students who prefer red  A to B and prefer red  D to C even though t h e  sum of 
B and C stochastically dominates the  sum of A and D. 
I t  will b e  useful t o  define precisely the  principle tha t  is being violated by the 
students' decisions in this  example. Definition 4 below is intended to do so; t h e r e  
are other  definitions tha t  have a grea te r  or lesser apparent  generality but are in 
fac t  equivalent. 
Def in i t ion  4. A preference relation on lotteries will b e  called sum-dominance 
consis tent  provided tha t  fo r  m y  probability 0 < p < 1, both of t he  preferences 
do not occur  whenever the  lot tery < p S(z + z; ), Q S(z + z j ) > i s  dominated 
by the  lot tery <pS(z2 + z; ), qS(z3 + Z i  ) > in tha t  
In the  above Problems 1 and 2, p = .25 and zl = 8240, z2 = $1000, 2 3  = 80, 
Zi = -$750, 2; = SO, a n d z j =  -8l000 . 
Before discussing the implications of sum-dominance consistency, w e  will 
describe a second, analogous type of dominance. To focus the  discussion, consider 
a person who wishes t o  invest a certain amount of money, which will be refer red  to 
as the  person's current f ind.  I t  is meaningful t o  measure the  consequences of the 
available investment lotteries not only by net gains and losses but also by percent 
increases and decreases in the  person's current  fund. Consider, fo r  example, the  
following choice problem. 
Problem 3. Imagine that  you face the  following pair  of concurrent decisions. 
First examine both decisions, then indicate the options you prefer .  
Decision (i). Choose between: 
A. a su re  gain of 6X 
B. a one-fourth chance t o  gain 25X. and a three-fourths chance t o  gain nothing 
Decision (ii). Choose between: 
C. a su re  loss of 15X 
D. a three-fourths chance to lose 20%. and a one-fourth chance to lose nothing. 
This problem has not been empirically tested. However, i t  is  similar t o  the 
Problem 1 tested by Tversky and Kahneman in that  mild risk aversion f o r  gains 
leads t o  a preference of A over  B and any degree of risk proneness f o r  losses 
leads to a preference of D over C. 
Now, consider the sequential occurrence of the  investment lotteries in the de- 
cisions (i) and (ii). (The resulting percent changes are the same regardless of 
whether decision (i) o r  decision (ii) occurs first.) 
Problem 4. Choose between: 
A and D. a one-fourth chance to gain 6X 
a three-fourths chance to lose 15.2X 
B and C. a one-fourth chance to gain 6.25X 
a three-fourths chance to lose 15X 
Note that  the  combination of the lotteries B and C dominates the combination 
of the lotteries A and D in this problem just as the combination of B and C dom- 
inates the combination of A and D in Problem 2. 
In general, let z denote a percent increase (z  >OX), a percent decrease 
(-100% < z < OX), or no change (z = OX) in a person's current  fund. Let 
< p (zX), q (z'X) > denote a lottery having a percent gain or loss of z with proba- 
bility p and a percent  gain or loss of z ' with probability q = 1 - p . Note that  if 
f i r s t  a percent change zl occurs and second a percent change z 2  occurs, then the 
overall percent  change is z + zz  + (zlz 2/ 100). Let zl0z2 denote this resulting 
percent change. 
Definition 5. A preference relation on lotteries will be called percent- 
dominance consistent provided that  f o r  any probability 0 < p < 1 ,  both of the 
preferences 
do  not occur whenever the  lottery <p(z1oz; X), q (zlOz j X) > is dominated by the 
lottery <p (z20zi X), q(z30zi X) > in that  
Z ~ O Z ~  < Z ~ O Z ~  and zlozj < 2302; . (12) 
In the  above Problems 3 and 4, p = .25 and zl  = 6X, z2 = 25X, z3  = OX, 
Z i  = -15%. Z i  = OX, and z j = -20%. 
Definitions 4 and 5 formalize certain requirements on preferences as pro- 
posed normative principles. The implications of these proposed principles are as 
follows. 
Theorem 4. Consider a decision problem in which the  possible consequences are 
financial changes measured ei ther  as absolute gains and losses z o r  as percent 
gains and losses z .  Assume that  the  decision maker's preference relation on lot- 
te r ies  satisfies (i) the  conditions of expected utility and (ii) the  condition that 
la rger  amounts are preferred.  Then: 
(a) The preference relation is sum-dominance consistent if and only if the  de- 
cision maker has a constant risk attitude f o r  possible net gains and 
losses. 
(b) The preference relation is percent-dominance consistent if and only if 
t he  decision maker has a constant proportional risk attitude f o r  possible 
amounts of his cu r ren t  fund. 
(c) Therefore, t h e  preference relation i s  both sum-dominance consistent and 
percent-dominance consistent if and only if t he  decision maker is risk 
neutral. 
Sum-dominance consistency and percent-dominance consistency appear  to be  
reasonable as normative principles. They exclude the  type of choice behavior that  
w a s  observed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) f o r  Problems 1 ,  2, and tha t  is con- 
jectured to occur f o r  Problems 3, 4. A s  Theorem 4 demonstrates, however, these 
principles exclude not only an  averse-prone risk attitude but any atti tude toward 
risk o the r  than r isk neutrality. 
The assumptions (i), (ii) in Theorem 4 require  tha t  t h e r e  exists a str ict ly  in- 
creasing utility function f o r  t he  preference relation. They do  not require,  howev- 
e r ,  t ha t  the utility function has derivatives of any o r d e r  or even that i t  is continu- 
ous. Thus, Theorem 4 applies in part icular  to the  preference relation f o r  t he  ef- 
fects  context in a reward-penalty model. 
5. Uses of the Reward-Penalty Yodel 
This section discusses f i r s t  t he  possible testing of t he  reward-penalty model 
as a descriptive model, and second i ts  possible usefulness as a prescriptive model 
in a decision analysis study. 
The reward-penalty model is sufficiently restr ict ive to be  testable as a 
descriptive model of preferences in choice behavior. In this sense, i t  is not sub- 
ject to t he  criticism of Tversky (1977) that  introducing additional variables as 
descriptors of psychological consequences i s  ad  hoc. However, any empirical 
study of the model t ha t  compares a person's preferences in t w o  different contexts 
(what w e  have oalled t h e  effects  context and the  no-effects context) will need to be  
carefully designed e i ther  to convey to the  persons being interviewed a clear 
understanding of t h e  effects  context and of t h e  no-effects context or to elicit by 
indirect questioning the i r  preferences in the  no-effects context. The design prob- 
lems will be  simpler f o r  an  empirical study tha t  considers only the  effects context 
and tests t h e  implications (a)-(f) in Theorem 2 of a reward-penalty model. Such a 
study could offer  indirect evidence as to the  descriptive accuracy of a reward- 
penalty model f o r  different types of persons and under different circumstances. 
The evidence is strong that  w e  humans have systematic and stubborn 
weaknesses in our  ability to process information on our preferences and our  pro- 
bibalistic beliefs (see, f o r  example, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982 and the  
review by Schoemaker, 1982). For this very reason, the  distinction between 
descriptive models and prescriptive models can be useful; descriptive models have 
the purpose of aiding our understanding as scientists of how people make decisions 
and prescriptive models have the  purpose of aiding our  ability as decision makers 
to process information f o r  making decisions (see, f o r  example, Bell, Raiffa, and 
Tversky, 1984, Howard, 1980, Keeney, 1982, and Raiffa, 1961.) Leaving aside the 
operational difficulties of assessing simple preferences, this argument depends on 
the  premise that  a prescriptive model can capture the  major preference concerns 
of the  decision maker. Thus, it is idso important to distinguish between those 
behavioral deviations from a prescriptive model that  are due to suboptimal infor- 
mation processing, i.e., heuristic biases, on the pa r t  of the  decision maker and 
those deviations that  are due to preference concerns of the  decision maker that 
are not included in the  model. 
The reward-penalty model i s  prescriptive r a t h e r  than descriptive in that  i t  is 
not intended to model a person's heuristic biases. Rather,  i t  is  intended to identify 
those psycho log id  effects that are regarded by the decision maker as an impor- 
tant  aspect of his consequences (and that  cause his preferences to deviate from 
the preference condition of framing consistency). The recognition of these effects 
in the model is to be regarded as the inclusion of a preference issue of importance 
to the decision maker r a t h e r  than as the inclusion of systematic imperfections in 
the  reasoning of the  decision maker. Thus, the purpose of the  reward-penalty 
model is m o r e  restr icted than the purposes of such general models as prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), weighted utility theory (Chew and MacCrim- 
mon, 1984), and SSB theory (Fishburn, 1982). 
In addition to t he  question of whether averse-prone choice behavior may ac- 
curately ref lect  a decision maker's preferences, and in that  sense is rational, 
t he re  is also the question of whether such choice behavior is  in the  best interest 
of an  organization or of society, and in that  sense is ethical. The psychological 
qualities tha t  are hypothesized in Section 1 to be  associated with averse-prone 
choice behavior are not flattering. In the  case of a n  individual who is acting on his 
own behalf, these qualities can be  negatively described as ego-centric and inflexi- 
ble; the person would r a t h e r  risk losing a la rger  amount than admit even to himself 
that  he  has suffered a loss. In the  case of an  individual who is acting on behalf of 
an organization, the re  is the  additional quality that  his concern f o r  his own repu- 
tation may at times be at variance with concerns f o r  the  effectiveness of the or- 
ganization; in common parlance, the person may be primarily concerned with "cov- 
ering his ass." 
Thus, f o r  decision analysis applications in which an  averse-prone risk attitude 
is an  important feature of the  decision maker's preferences, t he re  may be  cogent 
reasons f o r  formulating t w o  versions of the decision analysis model, one that  in- 
cludes n and p as additional parameters. and one tha t  does not (and thus assumes 
that  preferences are framing consistent). Both the effects context and the  no- 
effects context would thereby by considered. 
This caution as regards the  modeling of a decision maker's complete prefer- 
ences is similar to the  point made in Bell  (1985) "that what is  currently omitted 
from expected utility analysis deserves to be  omitted and tha t  a formal analysis 
may be  exactly what is needed to prevent a decision maker's intuition from forcing 
economically inefficient decisions [italics Bell's]. " This point is made also in Raiffa 
(1984). In a decision analysis application f o r  an organization, the most important 
preferences to be  examined may be those of an  exemplifying individual represent- 
ing the  ent ire  organization r a t h e r  than those of any single individual within the or- 
ganization. 
Appendix: Proofs of resulta 
Proof of Theorem 1. If u ( z )  is any utility function f o r  the  no-effects context, 
then u ( z )  = U(z ,z  l* ,..., zn *) f o r  some utility function U as described in (2). If 
w ( z )  is any utility function f o r  the effects context, then w ( z )  = 
f i (z  , r  l(z),... , rn  (2))  f o r  some (possibly different) utility function fi as in (2). 
hforeover, fi = a U  + b f o r  some constants a > 0 and b.  Therefore, 
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume tha t  the  utility function u f o r  the  no-effects context 
is normalized so that  u (0)  = 0. Let L denote the  lottery to be compared. 
To prove (a), observe that  f o r  z < 0,  w ( p z )  = u ( p z  - n) = u(-n) + o(1) 
while w ( 1 )  = pw(z) + qw(0) = pu( z -n )  = pu(-n)  + o(1). Thus p u ( ~ r )  > u(--rr) 
implies w ( 1 )  > w ( p z )  f o r  z < 0 sufficiently near  to 0. 
To prove (b), obse rve  tha t  f o r  z > 0 ,  w ( p z )  = u ( p z  + p) while w(1)  = 
PU (2 + P )  + qu  (0). Since u is strictly concave and p r 0,  
+ p) +qu(O) < u ( p ( z  + p ) )  S u ( p z  + p ) ,  andthus  w(1)  < w ( p z ) .  
To prove (c), i t  suffices to consider z > 0. Then, 
since p < n and u is s t r ic t ly  increasing. 
To prove (d), w e  must show that  w(1)  = p u ( z  - n) is less than 
w (pz ) = u (pz  -n) f o r  sufficiently la rge  negative z . A s  a f i r s t  observation, t h e  
condition of unbounded utility from below is well-known to imply that  t he  strictly 
increasing function U ( Z )  is unbounded from below (hence t h e  name). There are 
t w o  cases t o  consider: f i rs t ,  that  in which the  amounts z have a finite lower bound 
a (with a < -n so tha t  w ( z )  i s  defined f o r  some z < 0 )  and lim u ( z )  = -, and 
=+a+ 
second, that  in which the  amounts z have no lower bound and lirn u ( z )  = -. 
r -.- 
In the  f i r s t  case, l im  pu  (z -7r) = - while lim u ( p z  -n) = 
r -(a +n)+ r +(a +n)+ 
u (a  +(p -l)(a +n))  is finite since (p -l)(a +n) > 0. Therefore, 
pu  ( z  --T) < u (pz -n) f o r  all z less than some amount zp between a + n and 0. 
In the  second case,  t he  condition of decreasing risk aversion implies that  
lirn u'(z)  = +-. To show this, note that  u "(2)  6 0 f o r  all z implies that u'(z)  is 
r -.- 
decreasing f o r  all z .  Thus, lirn u'(z)  is a finite number b o r  is +a. If 
r -- 
lirn u'(z)  = b , then lim s u p ~  " (2 )  = 0 and hence lirn inf -u " ( z ) / u  ' ( 2 )  = 0. 
r -- r +- r-- 
However, decreasing risk aversion implies tha t  the  local risk aversion function 
-u "(2 )/ u '(2 ) i s  positive and decreasing (Prat t ,  1964). and this property contra- 
dicts the  previous statement. 
Now, assume tha t  0 < p < 1 i s  fixed. If n = 0 ,  then f o r  any z < 0 t h e  line from 
t h e  point (z,u ( 2 ) )  to t he  point (0,O) lies below the graph of u ,  and therefore 
p u ( z )  + qu(0 )  = p u ( z )  < u ( p z  + 9.0) = u ( p z ) .  
If n > 0 ,  then t h e r e  exists a number zo < - n such tha t  t he  line from 
(zo,u (zo)) t o  (-n.0) lies above the  graph of u . Since lirn u ' (2 )  = - and u ( z )  i s  
r +- 
unbounded from below, t h e r e  exists a unique zl  < zo such tha t  this line intersects 
the  graph of u also at ( z l , u  (xi)). Moreover, for any zp < z l ,  the  line f r o m  
(zp,u(zp))  to (-n,O) wi l l  also intersect  the  graph of u at a unique point 
(z; , u  (z; )) with z0 < Z; < - TT. Choosing zp so t ha t  pzp - TT < z; , it follows 
tha t  f o r  any amount z < zp , pu ( z  - TT) + q - 0  < u (p (Z -TT) + q (-TT)) and hence 
pu (Z -TT) < u (pz -TT) as w a s  to be shown. 
To prove (e), note tha t  t he  certainty equivalent of t is zo = 
u -'(pa ( z )  + qu ( z  ')) in the  no-effects context and zl = w -l(pw ( z )  + qw ( z  ')) 
where w ( t  ) = u ( t  -TT) is the  effects context. Since u represents  a n  att i tude of de- 
creasing r isk aversion, it follows by a resul t  in P r a t t  (1964, Theorem 2) tha t  
Z1 < Zo. 
Finally, the  proof of u) is similar to tha t  of (e) above except  tha t  
w ( t )  = u ( t  + p), p > 0, and hence zl > zo. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose tha t  f o r  t w o  different cu r r en t  asset positions 
c < c', t he  preference relations kk and satisfy the  condition of a n  averse- 
prone risk attitude. Then, framing consistency implies tha t  t he  preference rela- 
tion & is r isk ave r se  on the  range y > c and r isk prone on the  range y < c'.  For 
the  intersection range, c < y < c ', these r isk att i tudes are contradictory. 
Proof of Theorem 4. To show part (a), w e  wil l  relate the  condition of sum- 
dominance consistency to the  condition of a constant r isk attitude. Let I denote 
t he  interval of possible monetary changes z. One definition H m e y  (1981, 1986) of 
a constant risk att i tude is tha t  for any amounts hl < h2 < h3 and any probability 
0 < p  < I ,  if 
f o r  some z such tha t  z + h i ,  z + ho,  and z + h3 are in I, then 
f o r a n y z ' s u c h  t h a t z '  + hl. z' + h2,  a n d z '  + h 3 a r e i n I .  
For a preference relation 2 t ha t  satisfies the  conditions of expected utility 
and such tha t  l a rge r  amounts z are prefer red ,  this  condition holds if and only if 2 
can be represented by a utility function of the  form 
f o r  some parameter value r (Harvey, 1986). Note that  no assumptions of differen- 
tiability o r  even of continuity of the utility function u ( z )  are required. 
Assume that  the re  is a constant risk attitude and, in particular,  that  ;G is 
represented by a utility function u ( z )  = exp( rz )  fo r  some r > 0. Consider 
amounts zi ,Z i  i = 1,2,3, and a probability 0 < p < 1 as in Definition 4. Then, 
Therefore, the preferences (9) imply that  
which implies that  (10) is  false. Thus, 2 is sum-dominance consistent. Similar ar- 
guments can be  given f o r  the  cases u (2)  = z and u ( z  ) = --exp(rz ), r < 0. 
To show the  converse implication, f i r s t  assume that  t h e r e  is  not a constant 
risk attitude but that  the  utility function u ( z )  i s  continuous. Then, the re  exists 
amounts z + h i ,  z'  + h i ,  i = 1,2,3, in I and a probability 0 < p < 1 such that  (Al) 
is t rue  but (A2) is  false. By a slight change in p ,  i t  follows that  the  indifferences 
in (Al), (AZ) can be  replaced by opposite preference. Without loss of generality, 
assume that  t h e r e  i s  the  preferences + in (Al) and the preference 4 in (A2). 
Then, by the  continuity of u ( z ) ,  these preferences will remain t rue  when z + hl in 
(Al) is changed to a slightly smaller amount z + hi - d ,  d > 0. I t  follows that  fo r  
~ ~ = ~ + h ~ - d , ~ 2 = ~ + h ~ ,  z 3 = z + h 3  and Z i = Z ' + h l ,  Z i = z f + h 2 ,  
z; = z' + h3 the  conditions (9) and (10) are satisfied, i.e., t he re  is a violation of 
sum-dominance consistency. 
Second, assume that  the  utility function u ( z )  is not a continuous function on 
the  interval I. Since u ( z )  is  strictly increasing, i t  has only a finite or countably 
infinite number of points of discontinuity. Thus, w e  may choose a point zl  at which 
u ( z )  is discontinuous and a point Z i  at which u ( z )  is continuous. Suppose, fo r  ex- 
ample, that  sup {u (2 )  : z < z l j  < u (zl). Choose h > h '  > 0 such that  
z2 =z1 + h a n d z i  = z i  + h ' a r e i n 1 .  There exis t saprobabi l i ty0  < p  < l s u c h  
that  
f o r  all z < z Since u ( z  ) is continuous at z i , w e  can choose an z j < z i suff i- 
ciently near  to zi  so that  
Now, choose z3 sufficiently near  t o  zl so that  zl - 2 3  is less than Z i  - z$ . 
T h e n , z l + ( z i  + h f ) < ( z l + h ) + z i  a n d z l + z j  < z 3 + z i  . H e n c e , t h e r e i s a  
violation of sum-dominance consistency. A similar argument can be given for  the 
case i n f i u ( z )  : z > z l ]  > u(zl) .  
W e  will derive par t  (b) of Theorem 4 from par t  (a) by means of a change of 
variable argument. Suppose that the  decision maker's current  fund is denoted by a 
variable y = c + z where c is his initial fund and z is the  subsequent net change 
in the  fund. W e  assume that  y > 0 fo r  all net gains o r  losses z in the  interval I. 
Consider a new variable, w = log y . The preference relation associated with y , 
which w e  will denote here  by he induces a preference relation associated with w , 
which w e  will denote by &,. 
I t  is well-known that the preference relation ;L21 satisfies the  condition of a 
constant proportional risk attitude if and only if the  preference relation & satis- 
fies the condition of a aonstant risk attitude (see, e.g., Harvey, 1986 f o r  a detailed 
discussion). Thus, t o  prove par t  (b), i t  suffices to show that  is percent- 
dominance consistent if and only if &, is sum-dominance consistent. 
A lottery < p (z X), q (z 'X) > expressed in terms of percent changes z , z ' is 
equivalent to  the  lottery < p S b  ,q Sk 'y > with k = 1 + (z / loo),  
k ' = 1 + (z '/ 100) expressed in terms of asset positions. Therefore. Definition 5 
can be restated as the  condition that  fo r  any probability 0 < p < 1 both of the 
preferences 
do not occur whenever 
klk; < k 2 k i  and k l k j  < k 3 k i  . (A41 
However. a lottery < p *ky , q *k 'y > fo r  the  preference relation & corresponds 
t o  a lottery < p (Log k + Log y ), q (Log k ' + Log y ) > fo r  the  preference relation 
&,. Thus, the re  exist amounts ki ,ki  , i = 1.2.3. such that  (A3), (A4) are satisfied 
if and only if the re  exist amounts z i ,  Zi , i  = 1.2,3, such that (9), (10) are satis- 
fied. 
P a r t  (c) follows immediately from par ts  (a) and (b) since a utility function 
u (y ) is both linear-exponential and logarithmic-power if and only if i t  is linear. 
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